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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 On or about July 28, 2008, Plaintiff and Appellee Cadlerock Joint Venture 
II, LP, assignee of Cadleway Properties, Inc. ("Cadlerock"), served upon Appellant 
Michelex Corporation ("Michelex") two separate Writs of Garnishment (the "Writs"). 
(R. 120-27). These Writs were served on Michelex's Utah registered agent. (See id). 
2. Pursuant to the Writs and Rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Michelex was required to answer the Interrogatories attached therewith within seven (7) 
days after service, file answers to the Interrogatories with the district court, and serve a 
copy of the answers to the Interrogatories upon Cadlerock. See id; see also Utah R. Civ. 
P. 64D. 
3. Cadlerock's counsel never received Michelex's answers to the 
Interrogatories, and Michelex's responses were not filed with the district court. See 
Affidavit of Edward T. Vasquez. (Exhibit 1 to R.196). 
4. On September 10, 2008, Michelex was served with an Order to Show Cause 
Re: Garnishee Michelex's Failure to Respond to Writ of Garnishment Interrogatories 
issued by the district court. (R.145). The Order to Show Cause demanded that Michelex 
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appear and show cause why "Michelex should not be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the 
Judgment entered against Defendant/ Judgment Debtor Envelope Packaging of Utah . . . " 
ad). 
5. The hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held by the district court on 
September 23, 2008; no representative for Michelex appeared at the hearing. (See R.152). 
6. On November 11, 2008, the district court issued Bench Warrants in the 
amount of $2,500 against Michelex for its failure to appear at the Order to Show Cause 
hearing. These Bench Warrants were once again served upon Michelex's Utah registered 
agent. (SeeR. 153-60). 
7. On December 12, 2008, the district court held a hearing regarding the 
Bench Warrants issued against Michelex. No representative for Michelex appeared at the 
hearing. (SeeR. 161). 
8. At this hearing, the district court took evidence and determined that 
Cadlerock was entitled to a judgment against Michelex in the amount of $803,031.31. 
See Hearing Transcript (R.338). Cadlerock prepared a proposed Order and Judgment and 
sent Michelex a copy of the same on January 12, 2009. (See R. 167-71). 
9. The district court signed and entered the Order on January 16, 2009. See 
Order and Judgment, id. 
10. After the entry of the Order and Judgment, Michelex filed a document 
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entitled "Objection to Proposed Order and Judgment" on January 20, 2010 (R. 172-81). 
Michelex also filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on or about February 6, 
2009 (R.211-17). While the content of the objection and motion were essentially 
identical, neither the objection nor the motion provided any particular basis under rule 
60(b) to set aside the default judgment. (See id.) 
11. The motion to set aside (and the post-judgment objection) were denied 
pursuant to a Minute Entry dated August 12, 2009. (See R.318-25). 
12. Michelex appealed from this Minute Entry (see R.329-31), which Minute 
Entry by its terms served as the final Order of the district court (see R.318-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Michelex's first argument attacks the validity of the district court's Order and 
Judgment. However, Michelex did not timely appeal from the Order and Judgment, 
leaving this Court without jurisdiction to determine the validity of that ruling. In 
addition, Michelex failed to preserve its arguments as to the validity of the Order and 
Judgment, and fails to set forth a valid argument on the merits. 
Michelex's second argument attacks the district court's refusal to set aside the 
Order and Judgment under rule 60(b). However, Michelex fails to show that the district 
court abused its discretion when making this determination. It is clear that the district 
court appropriately analyzed Utah case law and was well within its discretion when it 
denied Michelex's motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MICHELEX'S FIRST ARGUMENT FAILS TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR 
REVERSAL. 
Argument I of Michelex's appeal brief focuses on purported errors committed by 
the district court when it entered its Order and Judgment against Michelex. This Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider these arguments, as Michelex did not timely appeal from the 
Order and Judgment. Moreover, these arguments were not raised below, and are legally 
insufficient in any event. 
A. Michelex Did Not Timely Appeal the District Court's Order and 
Judgment. 
The Order and Judgment against Michelex was entered on January 16, 2009. 
Michelex did not file a direct appeal from this Order and Judgment. Instead, Michelex 
appealed from the district court's decision to deny Michelex's rule 60(b) motion. 
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal must be 
filed within thirty days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a); Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, f7, 13 P.3d 616. A 
motion made under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not toll the time 
for appeal from the final judgment. See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shettler, 768 P.2d 950, 
970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Instead, a ruling on a rule 60(b) motion is a separate, 
appealable order. See id. An appeal from a rule 60(b) motion does not generally reach 
the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought or provide a basis for 
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this Court to review the legal issues previously adjudicated by the district court. See id., 
123. 
Michelex's second argument (Argument II) is dedicated to a discussion of the 
correctness of the district court's determination not to set aside the default judgment 
under rule 60(b). The first argument, on the other hand, clearly argues that the district 
i, mill ennJ v\lii/ii il iiiletvd lht imlriiii ml i Ilu lir.l phi f 1 " instanic Mididev 
complains at page 15 of its brief that "no evidentiary hearing was held prior to the entry 
of ' judgment, and that "the district court did not inquire as the Pangea court directed, it 
simply rendered its judgment against Michelex." Appellant's Brief, p :% Michelex 
I i ml^f <-» *5% >cess rights "coi ild ha > ' e beei I preserv M U MIK--U k] 
and the district court had complied with Rule 64D(j) by scheduling and holding an 
evidentiary hearing before signing the" default judgment. Id. The remainder of 
Argument I continues to argue that the district court erred procedurally and substantively 
when it entered tl le Oi dei ai id In ldgment. 
These arguments do not focus on purported errors relating to the refusal to set 
aside the default judgment; they relate to purported errors committed by the district court 
in entering the Ordei ai id Ji ldgi nei it ii I tl le f ii st instance ' *'[ • V]i I appeal ft on I a 60(b) 
motion does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from 
which relief is sought. A rule 60(b) motion cannot be used as a 'back door' to a direct 
appeal of the underlying motions." Lange v. Eby, 2006 UT App 118,16, 133 P.3d 451. 
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Yet, that is precisely what Michelex is attempting to do here. Because Michelex did not 
timely appeal from the Order and Judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
arguments presented in Argument I. 
B. The Arguments in Section I Were Not Preserved Below. 
Even if this Court determines it has jurisdiction to consider the arguments set 
forth in Argument I, these arguments should not be considered on appeal as they were not 
preserved below. 
Generally, this court will not review issues not preserved below. See Hart v. Salt 
Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App.1997). To preserve a substantive 
issue for appeal a party must first raise the issue before the district court. See id. The 
arguments raised in Argument I, lack of due process and failure to conform with Rule 64 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, were not raised below. Michelex does not show 
where these issues on appeal were raised in the district court, and, Cadlerock is unable to 
find such arguments in Michelex's rule 60(b) motion (R.211-17), its reply brief on that 
motion (R307-13), or in Michelex's objection to the Order and Judgment (R.172-81). 
Because these arguments were not raised below, this Court should not review them. See 
Hart, 945 P.2d at 129. 
C. Argument I Fails on the Merits. 
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of Argument I, this argument fails to 
provide a basis for reversal. Michelex relies almost exclusively on Pangea Technologies, 
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Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40, 94 P.3d 257. However, that case is 
inapposite. Pangea dealt with the issue of whether, pursuaul !o Rule tvll) of ihc I H;ih 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a garnishee is entitled to a hearing before judgment is entered 
against it. Though the garnishee in Pangea requested a hearing before entry of judgment, 
the district coi n I: dei lied tl lat i eqi lest ai id ^ \ ei it al lead ai id entered the judgment. See id., ffl[ 
4,11. Fhat is not the case here. Michelex was twice orders ^ miv \*\i-t. .*r-.- - \& 
Order and Judgment. Michelex refused. It was partly because of this refusal that the 
district court determined it was appropriate to enter the Order and Judgment. See Order 
anu juu.mnu:! ,K.lh ' 71 I V, oidinj'Js Pangea provides no n/lieflo Michelex ii I this 
case. 
Michelex also complains it was not notified that a judgment might be entered 
agaii ist it If it did not appear. This argument is demonstrably false from the face of the 
Order to Show Cause served oi i Micl lelex, w 1 licl 1 ii K Ii ided tl ic demai id that Micl lelex 
appear and show cause why it "should not be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the Judgment 
entered against Defendant/Judgment Debtor Envelope Packaging of Utah. . . ." (R.145). 
I -ast, Iv Ii- :::! lelex coi nplaii is tl lat tl lere was no evidence to support the amount of the 
judgment entered. Once again, this argument fails gi\ en the district coi ut's express 
determination in the Order and Judgment that evidence was presented to support the 
amount of the Order and Judgment. (See R.169). Such evidence was presented during 
1lu' course i»( ii I tii in; ILJI Mil hclex i hosi nol to attenc -t - tearing Transcript, pp. 2-6 
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(R.338). 
For each of these reasons, Michelex" s Argument I does not support reversal. 
IL MICHELEX FAILS TO SHOW THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN DENYING MICHELEX'S RULE 60(B) MOTION. 
In analyzing a motion to set aside, a district court should examine the following 
factors: (1) whether the motion filed by the movant is timely; (2) whether there is a basis 
for granting relief under any of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) whether the movant has a 
meritorious defense. See Menzies v. Galekta, 2006 UT 81 [^ 65, 150 P.3d 480; see also 
Erickson v. Schenker Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). Because 
Michelex failed to satisfy the second requirement set forth above, the district court 
properly denied its rule 60(b) motion. 
In its initial motion and memorandum submitted to the district court, Michelex 
failed to identify any particular ground under which it believed relief under rule 60(b) was 
appropriate. See Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment (R.211-17); see also Objection 
to Proposed Order and Judgment (R. 172-81). The first time Michelex even mentioned a 
ground under rule 60(b) was in its Reply Memorandum, where it argued that its conduct 
was "excusable neglect" under rule 60(b)(1). Reply Memorandum of Garnishee in 
Support of its Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment, p. 2 (R.307-13). On appeal, 
Michelex now argues it was entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(1) or (6). 
Rule 60(b)(1) provides 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
11 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief for "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
Michelex argued generally below that excusable neglect occurred under subsection 
60(b)(1) because Michelex and its New York counsel were "unfamiliar with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure concerning a Garnishee's continuing responsibilities to respond 
to Plaintiffs continuing requests for information, [and] disregarded the motions, 
pleadings and notices served upon it through its registered agent." Motion to Set Aside 
Order and Judgment, p. 3 (R.211-17). Michelex made no specific argument regarding 
how or why rule 60(b)(6) could or should apply.1 The district court ruled that, under 
either subsection, Michelex had failed to supply a basis on which a court may set aside a 
judgment under Rule 60(b): 
Michelex claims because it was unfamiliar with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure it ignored the subsequent motions 
and notices until it received notice of the Order and Judgment 
indeed, it is arguable that Michelex failed to sufficiently raise the issue below to 
warrant consideration on appeal. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comrn'n, 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct .App.1997). Moreover, this argument has not been sufficiently briefed on 
appeal to warrant consideration. Michelex provides no authority for the proposition that 
its conduct falls within rule 60(b)(6), and provides only one paragraph to this issue. See 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 313 (Utah 1998) (declining to address appellant's claim on appeal due to inadequate 
analysis). 
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on January 15, 2009. However, Michelex admits that it did 
have counsel before the Order and Judgment was entered by 
this Court. . . . [Where] a defendant demonstrates 
indifference on his part and lack of diligence to prosecute, a 
default judgment will not be disturbed. In the matter before 
this Court, Michelex was represented by counsel before the 
Order and Judgment was entered against it. Michelex asserts 
that it believed it responded to Plaintiffs Writs thereby 
"discharging its duty" and therefore disregarded the other 
motions and notices issued. While Subdivision (b)(6) is 
sufficiently broad to allow a court to set aside an order for the 
incompetence of counsel, a party may not claim neglect or 
incompetence on the part of his counsel, when he himself has 
been complacent in communicating with his counsel.. . . 
Michelex had ample notice of the proceedings before this 
Court and the consequences of failing to appear or in any 
other way communicate with the Court. However, it 
disregarded the notices assuming that its alleged single 
response relieved it from any further obligation to respond. 
Based upon the foregoing . . . Michelex's Motion to Set Aside 
is DENIED. 
Minute Entry, pp. 4-7 (citations omitted) (R.318-25). 
Utah appellate courts "will not reverse a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) 
motion unless the court has abused its discretion." Jones, 2009 UT 39, % 27. A district 
court abuses its discretion "only when its 'decision was against the logic of the 
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice . . . 
[or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice.'" Id. (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate 
Review, § 623 (2007)). 
Michelex fails to show that the district court abused its discretion. To the contrary, 
it is clear that the district court properly applied Utah law when it determined that 
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Michelex had failed to show it was entitled to relief under rule 60(b). The undisputed 
facts show that Michelex failed to exercise any diligence regarding this matter. Michelex 
was completely indifferent to these proceedings until judgment was entered against it. 
Michelex had both notice and an opportunity to be heard but deliberately chose to do 
nothing. Neither Michelex's nor its New York counsel's lack of knowledge regarding the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a basis to set aside the Judgment. See Black's Title Inc. 
v. Utah State Ins. Dept., 1999 UT App 330, ffif 10-14, 991 P.2d 607. The Writs provided 
instructions to respond, including the filing requirements for the answers to the 
Interrogatories. The Order to Show Cause stated that it was issued due to Michlelex's 
failure to answer the Interrogatories. The Bench Warrants required Michelex to appear 
before the district court. Neither Michelex nor its New York attorney exercised due 
diligence and rule 60(b) relief should not be granted. Michelex simply ignored the district 
court's proceedings and orders. Such action does not provide a basis for setting aside a 
default judgment under rule 60(b). 
Michelex's sole argument in this regard is that, based on the advice of its New 
York counsel, Michelex failed to file its responses to interrogatories, failed to respond to 
an order to show cause, and failed to respond to bench warrants. See Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 26-27. Michelex thus pleads "excusable neglect" when it ignored not only the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, but also a direct order to appear in the district court and bench 
warrants served upon Michelex. This argument fails as a matter of law. 
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First, Michelex supplies no record evidence (and none exists) to support its bare 
allegation that it relied on counsel's advice in disregarding orders to appear. Even if such 
evidence existed, however, it would not support a determination that this constitutes 
"excusable neglect." "To grant relief on the ground of excusable neglect where a party 
has exercised no diligence at all. . . subverts the purpose of the excusable neglect 
inquiry." Jones v. Layton/Oakland, 2009 UT 39, \ 23, 214 P.3d 859. "The neglect must 
be excusable upon some basis." Id.; see also Russell v. Martel, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194-95 
(Utah 1994) (defendant's indifference and lack of diligence regarding response to 
complaint supported district court's decision not to set aside default). Thus, to vacate a 
judgment, "the movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Black's Title 
Inc., 1999 UT App 330, \ 10 (citations omitted). Michelex's actions fall short of meeting 
this criteria. See Jones, 2009 UT 39, \ 29 (failing to respond to court pleadings, despite 
purported understanding that counsel had an "open-ended" extension to respond, "is 
inconsistent with even a minimum level of diligence"); see also Black's Title Inc., 1999 
UT App 330, T^ j 10-14 (affirming refusal to set aside a default judgment because the 
movant and his attorney failed to exercise due diligence in defending aigainst the action); 
Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, fflf 27-28, 183 P.3d 1059 (holding that there 
was no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to set aside a default judgment where the 
only excuse offered for an untimely response was that "the motion requiring the response 
15 
was inadvertently misplaced within a counsel's office"). 
Moreover, Michelex's inexplicable disregard of the district court's orders to 
appear cannot form the basis for setting aside a judgment under rule 60(b)(6). "Even 
assuming that [this subparagraph] is available to [appellant], his undenied statements that 
he felt no legal obligation to respond to the plaintiffs' claims support the district court's 
denial of his motion. Those statements evince a complete indifference by him and negate 
any diligence on his part in pursuing the opportunity to defend." Russell v. Martell, 681 
P.2d at 1195; see also Black's Title Inc., 1999 UT 330, If 15 ("subsection (6) may not be 
employed for relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1). 
Black argues that because he had no knowledge of the complaint, there was no neglect 
and thus Rule 60(b)(6) applies. Again, however, this lack of knowledge resulted from his 
own failure to exercise due diligence and thus the Commissioner properly viewed it only 
in the context of Rule 60(b)(1)."). 
The cases cited by Michelex do not assist it with its task of showing that the 
district court abused its discretion. In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that relief was proper under rule 60(b)(1) where a party 
reasonably relied on a bankruptcy stay in effect when the party failed to reply to a 
pleading. Id., fflf 13-16. The Court held that, "for rule 60(b) purposes, it is enough to 
state that there is substantial support for [this] interpretation of bankruptcy law." Id, j^ 
16. This "legitimate belief that no action would or could be taken against them due to the 
16 
bankruptcy stay constitutes a 'reasonable justification or excuse' for their failure to reply 
to the counterclaim." Id., \ 20. No such reasonable or rational justification exists here, 
nor is one offered by Michelex. To not know the effect of failing to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is one thing; to deliberately ignore court orders to appear 
and bench warrants is quite another. Michelex offers no "reasonable justification or 
excuse" for its actions in this regard. 
Michelex's citation to Abrogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT 
App 277, 191 P.3d 39, is also unavailing. In that case, this Court affirmed the district 
court's ruling that the appellant "did not show reasonable justification or excuse for its 
failure to answer." Id., ^ 28. The argument for a justifiable excuse was much stronger in 
Abrogast than it is here, as counsel for the defaulting party at least had some 
communications with the plaintiff; nevertheless, this Court was unable to say that the 
district court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the default. Id. Last, 
Michelex improperly cites Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74 (Utah 1973) for the wrong 
principal. See Appellant's Brief, p. 27. That decision has no bearing on the issues 
presented here. 
In sum, Michelex fails to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Michelex's motion to set aside the Order and Judgment. Because Michelex failed 
to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and ignored the district court's multiple 
orders to appear, it cannot show that it was diligent in any respect or that its neglect was 
17 
"excusable." 
Micheiex's assertion that it has a meritorious defense is rendered irrelevant by the 
fact that it failed to provide any justifiable basis for granting relief under Rule 60(b). 
There is "no need to consider whether there is a meritorious defense if there are not 
grounds for relief." Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^ 64; see also State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. 
Musselman, 667, P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983) ("it is unnecessary, and moreover 
inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defense unless the court is 
satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been showed"). Because Micheiex failed to present 
any justifiable grounds for relief, its motion was properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, Appellee requests that the district court's decision to deny 
Micheiex's rule 60(b) motion be affirmed. 
DATED this 9 ^ day of July, 2010. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
Edw§ra T. Vasquez 
Daniel J. Torkelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
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